This paper summarizes findings and conclusions from our application of the Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment Index developed by Fukuda-Parr, Lawson-Remer and Randolph (2009) to the states of Brazil. The key features of this methodology in assessing economic and human rights fulfillment is the focus on state obligations rather than only on human outcomes, and reference to both level of state resources and the historic achievements of comparator state parties as criteria in assessment. Our results show that none of the states of Brazil are completely meeting their obligations to fulfill economic and social rights although some are far more successful than others, and that fulfillment does not depend on income. States struggle most to meet their obligations to realize the right to decent work and adequate housing, but are somewhat better and meeting their obligations to fulfill the rights to education, the highest attainable standard of health and adequate food. Furthermore, a ranking of the states based on our findings differs significantly from rankings based on GDP per capita or the state-level Human Development Index values alone. This paper summarizes our methodology and findings and also proposes several avenues for further study.
Although Brazil as a country performs relatively well in the global ESRF rankings, placing 14 th out of 101 countries, the results of this disaggregated state level ESRF Index values and rankings show that this is an average that obscures a wide range of performance. Moreover, performance does not depend solely on resources nor on the level of human development. Our findings highlight the strong performance in fulfilling economic and human rights obligations on the part of relatively poorer states such as Paraná and the poor performance of higher income states, notably the Distrito Federal (Federal District) ii , which was the richest state overall in GDP per capita terms and ranked 1 st among all states in terms of the HDI in 2005 yet ranked 10 th out of 27 states on our index.
The state level ESRF rankings also differ significantly from rankings based on the disaggregated Human Development Index which has recently been used to measure human development in
Brazil at the national, state and even municipal level iii . The Brazil ESFR-I shows that no state is fully meeting its obligations for progressive realization, and that the lags are more marked in areas of decent work and housing than food, health and education.
This paper starts with a brief introduction of the development context of Brazil. The second section discusses the conceptual basis of the ESRF-I and the methodology for calculation as applied to Brazil. The third section presents the results of the Brazil ESRF Index. The fourth section discusses the findings. The final section presents conclusions and some questions for further research.
II. Development Context of Brazil
Brazil is an upper-middle income country characterized by a level of human development which has grown steadily over the past three decades. Brazil's score on the HDI in 2005 was .800, giving it a rank of 70 th out of 177 countries classified and qualifying Brazil for the first time as acountry enjoying "high human development" according to UNDP definitions (UNDP, 2007, p. 235 ). In the global ESRF rankings of 101 developing and non-OECD countries, Brazil at the national level placed 14 th , between 13 th place Thailand and 15 th place Armenia, with an ESRF value of 90.14. Matching trends that our research identified at the sub-national level, Brazil's final score was most impacted by poor performance on progressively realizing the right to adequate housing despite relatively good performance on realizing other rights, especially the right to education (Randolph et al, forthcoming) .
Garnering international attention as a member of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
group of developing countries with rapidly growing economies, Brazil saw its overall percentage of households below the national poverty line decline from 34% in 1990 to 19% in 2006 as GDP per capita slowly grew by 1.1% per year over the timeframe (IPEA, 2008; UNDP, 2007, p. 278) .
While Brazil's recent economic success and poverty-reduction advances are nothing short of laudable, massive inequalities remain a stark reality for the country. Brazil's score on the Gini index of inequality in national income distribution is .57 (1 representing complete inequality in the distribution of income) and the income share of the richest 20% of the population, at 61.1%, dwarfs that of the poorest 20% whose incomes represent just 2.1% of the national total (UNDP, 2007, p. 282) . While these inequalities cut across Brazilian society in a variety of ways, geographical differences between the states offer a striking manifestation of them. Família and the increasing share of social spending which is allocated to it may be cutting the flow of resources to other important sectors such as housing, education and sanitation infrastructure (Hall, 2009, p. 816 (Serageldin et al. 2003, p. 8-9) . A 2003 study by the Inter-American Development Bank and researchers from Harvard University found that participatory budget processes in Rio Grande do Sul have resulted in the consistent prioritization of resource allocation to key sectors such as urban infrastructure (roadways and water and sanitation), education and housing and to rural needs such as agriculture and transportation (Serageldin et al. 2003, p. 11) . A more recent World Bank study concluded that participatory budgeting in Brazil showed promise as a mechanism for redistribution and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2008, p. 6 Recognizing that the realization of these rights is in part a matter of resources, states parties are obligated to "progressively realize" economic and social rights to the greatest extent possible given existing resources so long as advances in rights fulfillment are never regressive (ICESCR, 1966 , Art. 3, Para 1).
These international commitments to economic and social rights are further reinforced by domestic guarantees. The current constitution, which came into force in 1988 following the transition from military to civilian rule, guarantees the rights to education, social welfare, work, housing and health in Article 6 of the document. The rights of workers, including the right to a minimum wage and to unemployment insurance, are detailed in Article 7 (Brazil, 1988) .
IV. Methodology
The basic premise of the ESRF-I is that existing socio-economic indicators are not suitable as measures of human rights fulfillment because they do not take into account the obligations of states to ensure that these rights are fulfilled ( To begin, separate datasets were assembled for each indicator using the statistical modeling software package SPSS with outcome indicators for each state and each year matched with a corresponding adjusted GDP per capita value. A scatter-plot was then generated with adjusted GDP per capita as the independent variable and the outcome indicator as the dependent variable. In order to get the best-fitting curve, we considered not only adjusted GDP per capita but also the natural log and square of GDP per capita as well. Figure 3 below shows the same scatter-plot shown in Figure 2 above with the APF curve superimposed. This function represents the best level of achievement for that particular indicator that we could expect for any given level of income, based on the historical experiences of the states of Brazil. In the case of the plot shown in Figure 3 below, the best-fitting curve for the data on under-five survival is an inverse function using the square of GDP per capita. This function was then used to calculate a "Frontier Value"
for each state and each year that we had data for. These values represent the precise levels of achievement that we could expect that state to achieve in that year based on its income at the time. Please see Annex II for a list of functions set to each indicator. Next we calculated the "rights fulfillment score" (X*) of each state for each year, using the following calculation in which the minimum value is the lowest observed value for that particular indicator for any of the states of Brazil:
Finally, in the case of states which had a level of income which should have enabled them to achieve full realization of the right in question yet still fell short of that level of achievement, a penalty was applied to their X* values. The calculation of the penalty was as follows, in which Xp represents the greatest possible X* value (generally 100) and Yp represents the level of income at which achievement should reach the highest attainable level according to the APF:
xCalculating the final ESRF-I scores incorporates the X* values for all states which were not subject to the penalty and the outcome of the penalty calculation for all states which received it.
First, rights sub-scores were calculated for each state for the last year data was available as follows:
Finally, the ESRF values for each state were calculated by finding the average of the five rights sub-scores as follows:
V. Findings
The findings of our application of the ESRF-I methodology to the states of Brazil are summarized in Figure 4 below which lists the states of Brazil in order from highest to lowest score on our index with data for each on per capita income, HDI score, and percentage of the population living above the poverty line to offer some context.
Our index highlights the achievements of medium and low-income states which manage to achieve significant results in realizing economic and social rights while also exposing the failure of higher-income states to achieve more given the level of resources available to them. For example, the southern state of Santa Catarina which tops the rankings based on our index is the What this fundamentally reveals is that none of the states of Brazil are fully meeting their obligations to fulfill economic and social human rights. However, states generally had more success meeting their obligations to fulfill the rights to food, health and education than they had with the right to decent work and the right to adequate housing. In interpreting these results, it is imperative to bear in mind that the X* scores and the subsequently calculated rights sub-scores measure the extent to which obligations are being met relative both to the range of historical attainment in Brazil itself and to the level of resources available to each state. Our findings with the education indicator for net enrollment of 7 to 14 year-olds present an illustrative example. This indicator was the sole educational indicator in our study and our analysis of historical trends showed that states of Brazil have historically been able to achieve high levels of enrollment at relatively low levels of income. The best-fitting APF for these data was an inverse function xi which predicted that enrollment should hit a peak of 100% at an adjusted GDP per capita level of about R$ 8,391.29. In 2006, both Piauí, the poorest state overall, and the Distrito Federal, the richest, had about 96% of their 7 to 14 year-olds enrolled in
school. However, Piauí ended up with a score of 100 while the Distrito Federal received only 87.51 on this indicator. Given Piauí's meager resources, the frontier value for the state was 95.1%, slightly lower than 95.68% enrollment rate that Piauí actually achieved in 2006. Since the actual value exceeded expectations, Piauí's X* rights fulfillment score for this right is 100.
The role of the penalty in determining the final X* scores for the more affluent states comes to bear in this example. The premise of the penalty is to reduce the fulfillment scores of states that have the resources necessary to fully meet their rights obligations but which still fail to do so. The adjusted GDP per capita level for Piauí was far below Yp, so no penalty was applied to its X* score. However, in the Distrito Federal, that state's high income gave it a frontier value of 100%. Its actual achievement in 2006 however was only 95.81%, giving it an X* score of 90.48.
Since the adjusted GDP per capita level in the District in 2006 was well above the level at which full enrollment should have been achieved (Yp), the penalty was applied here. Therefore, the actual final X* score for the Distrito Federal for education was 87.51, calculated as follows:
In the above calculation, X* is the initial X* score, X*p is the highest X* value achieved (Piauí's 100 in this case), GDP per capita is the value for 2006 and Yp is the income level at which full achievement of the right in question should be reached which was R$ 8,391.29 in this case. index also tend to have a more equitable distribution of income, suggesting that states which make the most effort to realize the rights of their citizens relative to their available resources are also making efforts to see that income is distributed more equally. However, for the sake of perspective even Santa Catarina, the most egalitarian state in terms of distribution of income, still has a higher Gini coefficient than that of neighboring Uruguay (.449) or even the United States Non-discrimination is a key human rights principle and one that should be a part of any measure of the realization of economic and social rights. Our attempts to take race into account in our application of this methodology to Brazil were hampered by a lack of data disaggregated by race for the indicators we used. Indeed, as the 2005 UNDP Brazil report noted, Brazilian race policies have historically paid little formal attention to race in legislation and record-keeping, stressing a race-neutral image of a multi-cultural Brazilian national identity instead (UNDP Brazil, 2005, p. 36, 46-47) . However, as the disaggregated HDI suggests, Brazilians of African descent enjoy a far lower level of human development than their white counterparts. While our calculations were not able to incorporate this explicitly, it is noteworthy that our ESRF values for the states of Brazil correlate negatively and strongly with the percentage of state population that is AfroBrazilian. Put another way, states which scored highly on our index tended to be those states which had the smallest percentage of Afro-Brazilian citizens. This relationship had a Pearson Correlation of -.822 which was statistically significant to the .01 level and is shown in the scatterplot below. Indeed, Bahia, a state which is overwhelmingly Afro-Brazilian, came in 22 nd out of 27 states in our index while Santa Catarina, the state with the smallest proportion of Afro-Brazilians, came in 1 st . Brazil's long historical experience with slavery as well as more recent rural-to-urban internal migrations have no doubt played a role in shaping the contemporary geographical distribution of populations of different races across the country and have doubtlessly played a role in shaping and calcifying some of the economic, political and social inequalities that persist along racial lines as well (UNDP Brazil, 2005, p. 19-25) . However, it is nevertheless of note that states which are making the most of their available resources to realize the economic and social rights of their citizens are those in which Afro-Brazilians are least-likely to live.
VI. Discussion and Questions for Further Research
While disaggregated raw data was not available for most indicators in our study, we did have income poverty data disaggregated by race for two years, 1991 and 2000. We applied the nationally-determined poverty APF to these data and compared the resulting disaggregated X* scores for all states. In no state did the extent of fulfillment of the obligation to eliminate poverty among blacks match efforts to eliminate poverty among whites. In some states, such as Alagoas and Maranhão, X* scores for poverty for whites were almost twice what they were for AfroBrazilians. This suggests that states are coming much closer to fulfilling their obligations to realize the economic and social rights of whites than they are for Afro-Brazilians and that there is indeed a precarious gap in rights fulfillment between the two groups on at least this indicator.
Although this index adds an important new dimension to the monitoring of the fulfillment of human rights obligations, it needs to be complemented with other indicators to make a fuller assessment of the human rights situation. It is particularly important to consider factors such as participation, equality and non-discrimination (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2009, p. 22, 24) , and structural and process aspects of human rights obligations. However, as our experiment with racially disaggregated income poverty data shows, better data disaggregated by race and also gender can enable the researcher to undertake ESRF analyses which can expose inequality and discrimination. For other aspects of human rights, the ESRF-I supplements other existing human rights measures and reporting mechanisms xii which tend to focus on legislative and institutional protections, processes for human rights protection and redress and data on the negative obligations to respect and protect human rights by permitting insight into the positive obligation to progressively realize economic and social human rights in a way that permits cross-state comparisons.
xiii -
VII. Conclusions
Over the last decade, the Brazilian state has taken important measures to act on its economic and social rights obligations. Policies such as Fome Zero and its flagship CCT program Bolsa Família were initially introduced as policies to help speed the progressive realization of these basic rights by making assistance available to all who needed it (de Britto, 2008, p. 188 ii Brazil has 26 states and one "autonomous sub-national entity", the Distrito Federal, which includes the capital Brasília and its outskirts. However, Brazilian record-keeping accords the Distrito Federal the same status as a state.
iii See for example the Atlas of Human Development developed by UNDP Brazil, available for download at ix Indicators were inverted so that ascending values represented greater achievement. For example, poverty rates were expressed as 'Percent of the population not poor' by subtracting the poverty rate from 100%.
x This is a slight variation on Penalty F suggested by Fukuda-Parr et all in their initial methodology. This penalty raises the income exponent to a power of .5, thereby making the penalty on higher-income states which fail to achieve high results somewhat less severe than the original Penalty F.
xi The precise function was xii See, for example, country and civil society reports submitted to the UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights or the human rights indicators being developed by OHCHR.
xiii Although this analysis is specific only to the states of Brazil, the ESRF-I was initially designed for application to international cross-country analysis.
